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Gees keep up everyone!
Moments ago I told you to expect chaos as a district court just held (for the first time) SMS Messages are NOT subject to the TCPA’s DNC rules.
I told you other courts would disagree.
Didn’t realize another court already had. On the same day. hahah.
In Wilson v. Skopos 2025 WL 2029274 (D. Or. July 21, 2025) the court refused to dismiss an SMS TCPA DNC case holding that SMS messages ARE calls subject to the TCPA’s DNC rules.
The meat of the ruling is:
The TCPA generally targets two types of unsolicited phone calls: those made using automatic dialers, 42 U.S.C. § 227(b), and those made in contravention of do-not-call registries, 42 U.S.C. § 227(c). For both, Congress explicitly conferred on the FCC the authority to promulgate implementing regulations. See §§ 227(b)(2), 227(c)(1)–(4). Through those regulations, the FCC has expanded the TCPA to apply to text messages. First, § 227(b)’s protections against automatic dialers were clarified as applying to both telephone calls and text messages issued without the recipient’s consent. See 2003 Rules & Reguls., 18 F.C.C. Rcd. at 14115 (“We affirm that under the TCPA, it is unlawful to make any call using an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded message to any wireless telephone number…. This encompasses both voice calls and text calls to wireless numbers including, for example, short message service (SMS) calls …. Congress found that automated or prerecorded telephone calls were a greater nuisance and invasion of privacy than live solicitation calls.”); In re Rules & Reguls. Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991, 30 F.C.C. Rcd. 7961 ¶ 107 (July 10, 2015) (“Glide raises the issue of whether SMS text messages are subject to the same consumer protections under the TCPA as voice calls. We reiterate that they are.”); see also Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 569 F.3d 946, 952 (9th Cir. 2009) (“a text message is a ‘call’ within the meaning of the TCPA”); Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 577 U.S. 153, 156 (2016) (“A text message to a cellular telephone, it is undisputed, qualifies as a ‘call’ within the compass of § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii).”). Recently, the FCC clarified “that text messages are included in the TCPA prohibitions and the private right of action in § 227(c)(5).” See Hudson v. Palm Beach Tan, Inc., No. 1:23CV486(WO) (JEP), 2024 WL 4190513, at *8 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 12, 2024), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:23 CV-486, 2024 WL 4188310 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 13, 2024). Indeed, in 2024, the FCC explained: “The Commission adopts the proposal to codify the National DNC Registry’s existing protections to text messages. Texters must have the consumer’s prior express invitation or permission before sending a marketing text to a wireless number in the DNC Registry.” Targeting and Eliminating Unlawful Text Messages, Implementation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Advanced Methods to Target and Eliminate Unlawful Robocalls, 89 Fed. Reg. 5098, 5101, 5099 (Jan. 26, 2024). Defendant’s argument that the FCC lacks authority to do so is undermined by the statutory structure of the TCPA, which explicitly delegates such authority, as well as the vast applicable case law which abides by the FCC’s regulations and guidance. Moreover, the FCC’s decision to include text messages is congruent with Congress’s overarching goals for the TCPA. Congress enacted the TCPA “to address a growing number of telephone marketing calls and certain telemarketing practices thought to be an invasion of consumer privacyand even a risk to public safety.” 2003 Rules & Reguls., 18 F.C.C. Rcd. at 14018. Section 227(c) specifically targets “the need to protect residential telephone subscribers’ privacy rights to avoid receiving telephone solicitations to which they object.” § 227(c)(1). With those goals in mind, the “basis” for the FCC’s conclusion becomes abundantly clear: unsolicited text messages invade the privacy and disturb the solitude of their recipients. See Van Patten v. Vertical Fitness Grp., LLC, 847 F.3d 1037, 1043 (9th Cir. 2017). They should therefore be included within the purview of the DNC Registry’s protections. The mere fact that Congress did not envision the ubiquitousness of text messaging in 1991 does not mean the FCC’s conclusion lacks support. On the contrary, as technology has developed over the years, so too has our understanding of the TCPA’s protections. See 2003 Rules & Reguls., 18 F.C.C. Rcd. at 14017 (“significant changes in the technologies and methods used to contact consumers … warrant modifications to our existing rules, and adoption of new rules if consumers are to continue to receive the protections that Congress intended to provide when it enacted the TCPA”). It cannot be argued in good faith that text messages are so categorially different from phone calls that the former cannot be considered an invasion of consumer privacy when directed at numbers on the DNC Registry”
Absolutely wild.
One court finds SMS messages are not subject to the TCPA’s DNC rules. Another court finds its not even a good faith argument to say SMS messages are not subject to the TCPA’s DNC rules– on the same day.
CHAOS.
Madness.
Chaos.
Madness.
Buckle up.
The Wilson ruling is also interesting because the messages appear to be transactional in nature but the court held they were marketing anyway. The messages read:
Plaintiff apparently claimed he did not fill out the lead form on LendingTree and the court found the message was marketing in nature.
The Court did not apply my big win in Aderhold here– that case held transactional messages are NOT marketing in nature. The Court’s analysis on the issue is thin.
Suffices to say very few lawyers can walk in the Czar’s footsteps… only I can win cases like this, it seems. (Kidding, but maybe not.)
Anyway take aways:
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Find Your Next Job !
Gees keep up everyone!
Moments ago I told you to expect chaos as a district court just held (for the first time) SMS Messages are NOT subject to the TCPA’s DNC rules.
I told you other courts would disagree.
Didn’t realize another court already had. On the same day. hahah.
In Wilson v. Skopos 2025 WL 2029274 (D. Or. July 21, 2025) the court refused to dismiss an SMS TCPA DNC case holding that SMS messages ARE calls subject to the TCPA’s DNC rules.
The meat of the ruling is:
The TCPA generally targets two types of unsolicited phone calls: those made using automatic dialers, 42 U.S.C. § 227(b), and those made in contravention of do-not-call registries, 42 U.S.C. § 227(c). For both, Congress explicitly conferred on the FCC the authority to promulgate implementing regulations. See §§ 227(b)(2), 227(c)(1)–(4). Through those regulations, the FCC has expanded the TCPA to apply to text messages. First, § 227(b)’s protections against automatic dialers were clarified as applying to both telephone calls and text messages issued without the recipient’s consent. See 2003 Rules & Reguls., 18 F.C.C. Rcd. at 14115 (“We affirm that under the TCPA, it is unlawful to make any call using an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded message to any wireless telephone number…. This encompasses both voice calls and text calls to wireless numbers including, for example, short message service (SMS) calls …. Congress found that automated or prerecorded telephone calls were a greater nuisance and invasion of privacy than live solicitation calls.”); In re Rules & Reguls. Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991, 30 F.C.C. Rcd. 7961 ¶ 107 (July 10, 2015) (“Glide raises the issue of whether SMS text messages are subject to the same consumer protections under the TCPA as voice calls. We reiterate that they are.”); see also Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 569 F.3d 946, 952 (9th Cir. 2009) (“a text message is a ‘call’ within the meaning of the TCPA”); Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 577 U.S. 153, 156 (2016) (“A text message to a cellular telephone, it is undisputed, qualifies as a ‘call’ within the compass of § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii).”). Recently, the FCC clarified “that text messages are included in the TCPA prohibitions and the private right of action in § 227(c)(5).” See Hudson v. Palm Beach Tan, Inc., No. 1:23CV486(WO) (JEP), 2024 WL 4190513, at *8 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 12, 2024), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:23 CV-486, 2024 WL 4188310 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 13, 2024). Indeed, in 2024, the FCC explained: “The Commission adopts the proposal to codify the National DNC Registry’s existing protections to text messages. Texters must have the consumer’s prior express invitation or permission before sending a marketing text to a wireless number in the DNC Registry.” Targeting and Eliminating Unlawful Text Messages, Implementation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Advanced Methods to Target and Eliminate Unlawful Robocalls, 89 Fed. Reg. 5098, 5101, 5099 (Jan. 26, 2024). Defendant’s argument that the FCC lacks authority to do so is undermined by the statutory structure of the TCPA, which explicitly delegates such authority, as well as the vast applicable case law which abides by the FCC’s regulations and guidance. Moreover, the FCC’s decision to include text messages is congruent with Congress’s overarching goals for the TCPA. Congress enacted the TCPA “to address a growing number of telephone marketing calls and certain telemarketing practices thought to be an invasion of consumer privacyand even a risk to public safety.” 2003 Rules & Reguls., 18 F.C.C. Rcd. at 14018. Section 227(c) specifically targets “the need to protect residential telephone subscribers’ privacy rights to avoid receiving telephone solicitations to which they object.” § 227(c)(1). With those goals in mind, the “basis” for the FCC’s conclusion becomes abundantly clear: unsolicited text messages invade the privacy and disturb the solitude of their recipients. See Van Patten v. Vertical Fitness Grp., LLC, 847 F.3d 1037, 1043 (9th Cir. 2017). They should therefore be included within the purview of the DNC Registry’s protections. The mere fact that Congress did not envision the ubiquitousness of text messaging in 1991 does not mean the FCC’s conclusion lacks support. On the contrary, as technology has developed over the years, so too has our understanding of the TCPA’s protections. See 2003 Rules & Reguls., 18 F.C.C. Rcd. at 14017 (“significant changes in the technologies and methods used to contact consumers … warrant modifications to our existing rules, and adoption of new rules if consumers are to continue to receive the protections that Congress intended to provide when it enacted the TCPA”). It cannot be argued in good faith that text messages are so categorially different from phone calls that the former cannot be considered an invasion of consumer privacy when directed at numbers on the DNC Registry”
Absolutely wild.
One court finds SMS messages are not subject to the TCPA’s DNC rules. Another court finds its not even a good faith argument to say SMS messages are not subject to the TCPA’s DNC rules– on the same day.
CHAOS.
Madness.
Chaos.
Madness.
Buckle up.
The Wilson ruling is also interesting because the messages appear to be transactional in nature but the court held they were marketing anyway. The messages read:
Plaintiff apparently claimed he did not fill out the lead form on LendingTree and the court found the message was marketing in nature.
The Court did not apply my big win in Aderhold here– that case held transactional messages are NOT marketing in nature. The Court’s analysis on the issue is thin.
Suffices to say very few lawyers can walk in the Czar’s footsteps… only I can win cases like this, it seems. (Kidding, but maybe not.)
Anyway take aways:
More Upcoming Events
Sign Up for any (or all) of our 25+ Newsletters
You are responsible for reading, understanding, and agreeing to the National Law Review’s (NLR’s) and the National Law Forum LLC’s Terms of Use and Privacy Policy before using the National Law Review website. The National Law Review is a free-to-use, no-log-in database of legal and business articles. The content and links on www.NatLawReview.com are intended for general information purposes only. Any legal analysis, legislative updates, or other content and links should not be construed as legal or professional advice or a substitute for such advice. No attorney-client or confidential relationship is formed by the transmission of information between you and the National Law Review website or any of the law firms, attorneys, or other professionals or organizations who include content on the National Law Review website. If you require legal or professional advice, kindly contact an attorney or other suitable professional advisor.
Some states have laws and ethical rules regarding solicitation and advertisement practices by attorneys and/or other professionals. The National Law Review is not a law firm nor is www.NatLawReview.com intended to be a referral service for attorneys and/or other professionals. The NLR does not wish, nor does it intend, to solicit the business of anyone or to refer anyone to an attorney or other professional. NLR does not answer legal questions nor will we refer you to an attorney or other professional if you request such information from us.
Under certain state laws, the following statements may be required on this website and we have included them in order to be in full compliance with these rules. The choice of a lawyer or other professional is an important decision and should not be based solely upon advertisements. Attorney Advertising Notice: Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome. Statement in compliance with Texas Rules of Professional Conduct. Unless otherwise noted, attorneys are not certified by the Texas Board of Legal Specialization, nor can NLR attest to the accuracy of any notation of Legal Specialization or other Professional Credentials.
The National Law Review – National Law Forum LLC 2070 Green Bay Rd., Suite 178, Highland Park, IL 60035 Telephone (708) 357-3317 or toll-free (877) 357-3317. If you would like to contact us via email please click here.
Copyright ©2025 National Law Forum, LLC