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In Stockdale v. Skymount Prop. Grp., LLC, et al., No. 1:25 CV 1282, 2026 WL 591842 (N.D. Ohio March 3, 2026), Judge Patricia A. Gaughan of the Northern District of Ohio held that text messages are not “telephone calls” under 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5). In the Court’s own words: “Without any clear guidance from either the Sixth Circuit or the Supreme Court, this Court joins several others in holding that the term ‘telephone call’ as used in Section 227(c)(5) of the TCPA does not encompass ‘text messages.’” Id. at *2.
This is one of the most analytically clean rulings we’ve seen on either side of this split.
So let’s break it down! Here, Plaintiff registered her cell number on the National Do-Not-Call Registry back in 2017. Starting in February 2022, Skymount Property Group and Skymount Realty began texting her cell phone to solicit her to sell her house. In turn, Plaintiff sued under § 227(c)(5).
Skymount moved to dismiss, arguing that the statute only covers “telephone calls,” not text messages, and the Court agreed!
So, where do you normally start? Well, the Court started where you’d expect, with the plain meaning of “telephone call” at the time Congress enacted the TCPA in 1991. Using the 1990 Merriam-Webster New Collegiate Dictionary, the Court found that “call” meant “the act of calling on the telephone” and “telephone” meant “an instrument for reproducing sounds at a distance.” Id. Under those definitions, the court concluded that text messages simply cannot be “telephone calls” because they don’t use a telephone to reproduce sounds at a distance. Id.
Here’s where the opinion gets really noteworthy. Rather than relying solely on dictionary definitions, Judge Gaughan methodically dismantled the reasoning that courts on the other side of the split have relied on.
First, the Court criticized courts that used dictionary definitions of “call” from 2002 or later, rather than from 1991 when the statute was enacted. The Court specifically called out Mujahid v. Newity, LLC, 2025 WL 3140725 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 10, 2025) for using a 2002 definition and Wilson v. MEDVIDI Inc., 2025 WL 2856295 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2025) for referencing a 2024 dictionary. That’s a problem because Loper Bright tells us a statute’s meaning is fixed at the time of enactment. You can’t use a modern dictionary to define a 1991 statute. See id. at *3 n.5.
Second, the Court went after courts that used a 1991 dictionary definition of “call” but failed to consider the contemporaneous definition of the modifying word “telephone.” By way of example, the Court specifically named Wilson v. Better Mortgage Corp., 2025 WL 3493815 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2025) and even the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Howard v. Republican Nat’l Comm., 164 F.4th 1119 (9th Cir. 2026) on this point.
Third, and this is the big one, the Court took direct aim at the reasoning in Alvarez v. Fiesta Nissan, Inc., 2026 WL 202930 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 26, 2026), which had offered the most thorough analysis on the “texts are calls” side. In Alvarez, it was asserted that because a modern cell phone includes the capabilities of a 1991 telephone (reproducing sound), then a cell phone is essentially a 1991 telephone, and therefore any communication sent from a cell phone qualifies as a “telephone call.”
But that’s the wrong question. The Court reasoned that the issue isn’t whether a modern cell phone fits the 1991 definition of “telephone.” It’s whether the word “call” as modified by “telephone” in 1991 can include text messages. And the Court’s response here? The answer is no. Just because a later technology encapsulates an earlier technology, it doesn’t follow that the capabilities of the later technology are equivalent to the capabilities of the earlier technology. In 1991, the only capability covered by “telephone call” was reproducing sound. Modern capabilities beyond that, including texting, aren’t covered. See id. at *4.
That’s a sharp rebuttal. Which raises the question: if every communication from a modern cell phone is a “telephone call,” then messages sent through apps downloaded onto a phone would also be “telephone calls” under the TCPA. That can’t be right.
The Court also acknowledged that its ruling “arguably stands in contrast to decades of FCC agency interpretations, court decisions, and even congressional intent.” But it noted that such contradictions are the natural consequence of the Supreme Court overruling Chevron in Loper Bright and redefining the landscape in McLaughlin. If the plain language of the statute doesn’t match Congress’s intent, the Court said, it’s for Congress to fix, not the courts. See id. at *4.
It’s also extremely important to point out this footnote where the Court rejected Plaintiff’s argument that 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(e) somehow defines “telephone call” to include texts. The Court read that regulation carefully and concluded it only makes the DNC regulations applicable to entities sending telemarketing text messages. It says nothing about whether the person receiving that text has a private right of action under § 227(c)(5). See id. at *3 n.7. That’s a distinction that matters, and one that courts on the other side of the split have largely glossed over.
So what are the takeaways?
First, a federal court within the Sixth Circuit has now weighed in on the texts-versus-calls question, and it sides firmly with the “texts are not calls” position. That’s significant because there was no prior guidance from the 6th Circuit or any binding authority in this jurisdiction.
Second, the Court’s critique of the other side’s reasoning is the most thorough we’ve seen from any texts ≠ calls opinions. Here, the Court explained precisely why the dictionary analysis in Alvarez, Mujahid, Medvidi, Better Mortgage, and even the 9th Circuit’s Howard decision is flawed.
Lastly, the “1991 definition” approach is becoming the key battleground. Courts that define both “telephone” and “call” as of 1991 are landing on texts ≠ calls. Conversely, courts that use modern definitions or define “call” without considering “telephone” are reaching the conclusion that texts = calls.
In Stockdale v. Skymount Prop. Grp., LLC, et al., No. 1:25 CV 1282, 2026 WL 591842 (N.D. Ohio March 3, 2026), Judge Patricia A. Gaughan of the Northern District of Ohio held that text messages are not “telephone calls” under 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5). In the Court’s own words: “Without any clear guidance from either the Sixth Circuit or the Supreme Court, this Court joins several others in holding that the term ‘telephone call’ as used in Section 227(c)(5) of the TCPA does not encompass ‘text messages.’” Id. at *2.
This is one of the most analytically clean rulings we’ve seen on either side of this split.
So let’s break it down! Here, Plaintiff registered her cell number on the National Do-Not-Call Registry back in 2017. Starting in February 2022, Skymount Property Group and Skymount Realty began texting her cell phone to solicit her to sell her house. In turn, Plaintiff sued under § 227(c)(5).
Skymount moved to dismiss, arguing that the statute only covers “telephone calls,” not text messages, and the Court agreed!
So, where do you normally start? Well, the Court started where you’d expect, with the plain meaning of “telephone call” at the time Congress enacted the TCPA in 1991. Using the 1990 Merriam-Webster New Collegiate Dictionary, the Court found that “call” meant “the act of calling on the telephone” and “telephone” meant “an instrument for reproducing sounds at a distance.” Id. Under those definitions, the court concluded that text messages simply cannot be “telephone calls” because they don’t use a telephone to reproduce sounds at a distance. Id.
Here’s where the opinion gets really noteworthy. Rather than relying solely on dictionary definitions, Judge Gaughan methodically dismantled the reasoning that courts on the other side of the split have relied on.
First, the Court criticized courts that used dictionary definitions of “call” from 2002 or later, rather than from 1991 when the statute was enacted. The Court specifically called out Mujahid v. Newity, LLC, 2025 WL 3140725 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 10, 2025) for using a 2002 definition and Wilson v. MEDVIDI Inc., 2025 WL 2856295 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2025) for referencing a 2024 dictionary. That’s a problem because Loper Bright tells us a statute’s meaning is fixed at the time of enactment. You can’t use a modern dictionary to define a 1991 statute. See id. at *3 n.5.
Second, the Court went after courts that used a 1991 dictionary definition of “call” but failed to consider the contemporaneous definition of the modifying word “telephone.” By way of example, the Court specifically named Wilson v. Better Mortgage Corp., 2025 WL 3493815 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2025) and even the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Howard v. Republican Nat’l Comm., 164 F.4th 1119 (9th Cir. 2026) on this point.
Third, and this is the big one, the Court took direct aim at the reasoning in Alvarez v. Fiesta Nissan, Inc., 2026 WL 202930 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 26, 2026), which had offered the most thorough analysis on the “texts are calls” side. In Alvarez, it was asserted that because a modern cell phone includes the capabilities of a 1991 telephone (reproducing sound), then a cell phone is essentially a 1991 telephone, and therefore any communication sent from a cell phone qualifies as a “telephone call.”
But that’s the wrong question. The Court reasoned that the issue isn’t whether a modern cell phone fits the 1991 definition of “telephone.” It’s whether the word “call” as modified by “telephone” in 1991 can include text messages. And the Court’s response here? The answer is no. Just because a later technology encapsulates an earlier technology, it doesn’t follow that the capabilities of the later technology are equivalent to the capabilities of the earlier technology. In 1991, the only capability covered by “telephone call” was reproducing sound. Modern capabilities beyond that, including texting, aren’t covered. See id. at *4.
That’s a sharp rebuttal. Which raises the question: if every communication from a modern cell phone is a “telephone call,” then messages sent through apps downloaded onto a phone would also be “telephone calls” under the TCPA. That can’t be right.
The Court also acknowledged that its ruling “arguably stands in contrast to decades of FCC agency interpretations, court decisions, and even congressional intent.” But it noted that such contradictions are the natural consequence of the Supreme Court overruling Chevron in Loper Bright and redefining the landscape in McLaughlin. If the plain language of the statute doesn’t match Congress’s intent, the Court said, it’s for Congress to fix, not the courts. See id. at *4.
It’s also extremely important to point out this footnote where the Court rejected Plaintiff’s argument that 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(e) somehow defines “telephone call” to include texts. The Court read that regulation carefully and concluded it only makes the DNC regulations applicable to entities sending telemarketing text messages. It says nothing about whether the person receiving that text has a private right of action under § 227(c)(5). See id. at *3 n.7. That’s a distinction that matters, and one that courts on the other side of the split have largely glossed over.
So what are the takeaways?
First, a federal court within the Sixth Circuit has now weighed in on the texts-versus-calls question, and it sides firmly with the “texts are not calls” position. That’s significant because there was no prior guidance from the 6th Circuit or any binding authority in this jurisdiction.
Second, the Court’s critique of the other side’s reasoning is the most thorough we’ve seen from any texts ≠ calls opinions. Here, the Court explained precisely why the dictionary analysis in Alvarez, Mujahid, Medvidi, Better Mortgage, and even the 9th Circuit’s Howard decision is flawed.
Lastly, the “1991 definition” approach is becoming the key battleground. Courts that define both “telephone” and “call” as of 1991 are landing on texts ≠ calls. Conversely, courts that use modern definitions or define “call” without considering “telephone” are reaching the conclusion that texts = calls.
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In Stockdale v. Skymount Prop. Grp., LLC, et al., No. 1:25 CV 1282, 2026 WL 591842 (N.D. Ohio March 3, 2026), Judge Patricia A. Gaughan of the Northern District of Ohio held that text messages are not “telephone calls” under 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5). In the Court’s own words: “Without any clear guidance from either the Sixth Circuit or the Supreme Court, this Court joins several others in holding that the term ‘telephone call’ as used in Section 227(c)(5) of the TCPA does not encompass ‘text messages.’” Id. at *2.
This is one of the most analytically clean rulings we’ve seen on either side of this split.
So let’s break it down! Here, Plaintiff registered her cell number on the National Do-Not-Call Registry back in 2017. Starting in February 2022, Skymount Property Group and Skymount Realty began texting her cell phone to solicit her to sell her house. In turn, Plaintiff sued under § 227(c)(5).
Skymount moved to dismiss, arguing that the statute only covers “telephone calls,” not text messages, and the Court agreed!
So, where do you normally start? Well, the Court started where you’d expect, with the plain meaning of “telephone call” at the time Congress enacted the TCPA in 1991. Using the 1990 Merriam-Webster New Collegiate Dictionary, the Court found that “call” meant “the act of calling on the telephone” and “telephone” meant “an instrument for reproducing sounds at a distance.” Id. Under those definitions, the court concluded that text messages simply cannot be “telephone calls” because they don’t use a telephone to reproduce sounds at a distance. Id.
Here’s where the opinion gets really noteworthy. Rather than relying solely on dictionary definitions, Judge Gaughan methodically dismantled the reasoning that courts on the other side of the split have relied on.
First, the Court criticized courts that used dictionary definitions of “call” from 2002 or later, rather than from 1991 when the statute was enacted. The Court specifically called out Mujahid v. Newity, LLC, 2025 WL 3140725 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 10, 2025) for using a 2002 definition and Wilson v. MEDVIDI Inc., 2025 WL 2856295 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2025) for referencing a 2024 dictionary. That’s a problem because Loper Bright tells us a statute’s meaning is fixed at the time of enactment. You can’t use a modern dictionary to define a 1991 statute. See id. at *3 n.5.
Second, the Court went after courts that used a 1991 dictionary definition of “call” but failed to consider the contemporaneous definition of the modifying word “telephone.” By way of example, the Court specifically named Wilson v. Better Mortgage Corp., 2025 WL 3493815 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2025) and even the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Howard v. Republican Nat’l Comm., 164 F.4th 1119 (9th Cir. 2026) on this point.
Third, and this is the big one, the Court took direct aim at the reasoning in Alvarez v. Fiesta Nissan, Inc., 2026 WL 202930 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 26, 2026), which had offered the most thorough analysis on the “texts are calls” side. In Alvarez, it was asserted that because a modern cell phone includes the capabilities of a 1991 telephone (reproducing sound), then a cell phone is essentially a 1991 telephone, and therefore any communication sent from a cell phone qualifies as a “telephone call.”
But that’s the wrong question. The Court reasoned that the issue isn’t whether a modern cell phone fits the 1991 definition of “telephone.” It’s whether the word “call” as modified by “telephone” in 1991 can include text messages. And the Court’s response here? The answer is no. Just because a later technology encapsulates an earlier technology, it doesn’t follow that the capabilities of the later technology are equivalent to the capabilities of the earlier technology. In 1991, the only capability covered by “telephone call” was reproducing sound. Modern capabilities beyond that, including texting, aren’t covered. See id. at *4.
That’s a sharp rebuttal. Which raises the question: if every communication from a modern cell phone is a “telephone call,” then messages sent through apps downloaded onto a phone would also be “telephone calls” under the TCPA. That can’t be right.
The Court also acknowledged that its ruling “arguably stands in contrast to decades of FCC agency interpretations, court decisions, and even congressional intent.” But it noted that such contradictions are the natural consequence of the Supreme Court overruling Chevron in Loper Bright and redefining the landscape in McLaughlin. If the plain language of the statute doesn’t match Congress’s intent, the Court said, it’s for Congress to fix, not the courts. See id. at *4.
It’s also extremely important to point out this footnote where the Court rejected Plaintiff’s argument that 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(e) somehow defines “telephone call” to include texts. The Court read that regulation carefully and concluded it only makes the DNC regulations applicable to entities sending telemarketing text messages. It says nothing about whether the person receiving that text has a private right of action under § 227(c)(5). See id. at *3 n.7. That’s a distinction that matters, and one that courts on the other side of the split have largely glossed over.
So what are the takeaways?
First, a federal court within the Sixth Circuit has now weighed in on the texts-versus-calls question, and it sides firmly with the “texts are not calls” position. That’s significant because there was no prior guidance from the 6th Circuit or any binding authority in this jurisdiction.
Second, the Court’s critique of the other side’s reasoning is the most thorough we’ve seen from any texts ≠ calls opinions. Here, the Court explained precisely why the dictionary analysis in Alvarez, Mujahid, Medvidi, Better Mortgage, and even the 9th Circuit’s Howard decision is flawed.
Lastly, the “1991 definition” approach is becoming the key battleground. Courts that define both “telephone” and “call” as of 1991 are landing on texts ≠ calls. Conversely, courts that use modern definitions or define “call” without considering “telephone” are reaching the conclusion that texts = calls.
In Stockdale v. Skymount Prop. Grp., LLC, et al., No. 1:25 CV 1282, 2026 WL 591842 (N.D. Ohio March 3, 2026), Judge Patricia A. Gaughan of the Northern District of Ohio held that text messages are not “telephone calls” under 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5). In the Court’s own words: “Without any clear guidance from either the Sixth Circuit or the Supreme Court, this Court joins several others in holding that the term ‘telephone call’ as used in Section 227(c)(5) of the TCPA does not encompass ‘text messages.’” Id. at *2.
This is one of the most analytically clean rulings we’ve seen on either side of this split.
So let’s break it down! Here, Plaintiff registered her cell number on the National Do-Not-Call Registry back in 2017. Starting in February 2022, Skymount Property Group and Skymount Realty began texting her cell phone to solicit her to sell her house. In turn, Plaintiff sued under § 227(c)(5).
Skymount moved to dismiss, arguing that the statute only covers “telephone calls,” not text messages, and the Court agreed!
So, where do you normally start? Well, the Court started where you’d expect, with the plain meaning of “telephone call” at the time Congress enacted the TCPA in 1991. Using the 1990 Merriam-Webster New Collegiate Dictionary, the Court found that “call” meant “the act of calling on the telephone” and “telephone” meant “an instrument for reproducing sounds at a distance.” Id. Under those definitions, the court concluded that text messages simply cannot be “telephone calls” because they don’t use a telephone to reproduce sounds at a distance. Id.
Here’s where the opinion gets really noteworthy. Rather than relying solely on dictionary definitions, Judge Gaughan methodically dismantled the reasoning that courts on the other side of the split have relied on.
First, the Court criticized courts that used dictionary definitions of “call” from 2002 or later, rather than from 1991 when the statute was enacted. The Court specifically called out Mujahid v. Newity, LLC, 2025 WL 3140725 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 10, 2025) for using a 2002 definition and Wilson v. MEDVIDI Inc., 2025 WL 2856295 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2025) for referencing a 2024 dictionary. That’s a problem because Loper Bright tells us a statute’s meaning is fixed at the time of enactment. You can’t use a modern dictionary to define a 1991 statute. See id. at *3 n.5.
Second, the Court went after courts that used a 1991 dictionary definition of “call” but failed to consider the contemporaneous definition of the modifying word “telephone.” By way of example, the Court specifically named Wilson v. Better Mortgage Corp., 2025 WL 3493815 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2025) and even the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Howard v. Republican Nat’l Comm., 164 F.4th 1119 (9th Cir. 2026) on this point.
Third, and this is the big one, the Court took direct aim at the reasoning in Alvarez v. Fiesta Nissan, Inc., 2026 WL 202930 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 26, 2026), which had offered the most thorough analysis on the “texts are calls” side. In Alvarez, it was asserted that because a modern cell phone includes the capabilities of a 1991 telephone (reproducing sound), then a cell phone is essentially a 1991 telephone, and therefore any communication sent from a cell phone qualifies as a “telephone call.”
But that’s the wrong question. The Court reasoned that the issue isn’t whether a modern cell phone fits the 1991 definition of “telephone.” It’s whether the word “call” as modified by “telephone” in 1991 can include text messages. And the Court’s response here? The answer is no. Just because a later technology encapsulates an earlier technology, it doesn’t follow that the capabilities of the later technology are equivalent to the capabilities of the earlier technology. In 1991, the only capability covered by “telephone call” was reproducing sound. Modern capabilities beyond that, including texting, aren’t covered. See id. at *4.
That’s a sharp rebuttal. Which raises the question: if every communication from a modern cell phone is a “telephone call,” then messages sent through apps downloaded onto a phone would also be “telephone calls” under the TCPA. That can’t be right.
The Court also acknowledged that its ruling “arguably stands in contrast to decades of FCC agency interpretations, court decisions, and even congressional intent.” But it noted that such contradictions are the natural consequence of the Supreme Court overruling Chevron in Loper Bright and redefining the landscape in McLaughlin. If the plain language of the statute doesn’t match Congress’s intent, the Court said, it’s for Congress to fix, not the courts. See id. at *4.
It’s also extremely important to point out this footnote where the Court rejected Plaintiff’s argument that 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(e) somehow defines “telephone call” to include texts. The Court read that regulation carefully and concluded it only makes the DNC regulations applicable to entities sending telemarketing text messages. It says nothing about whether the person receiving that text has a private right of action under § 227(c)(5). See id. at *3 n.7. That’s a distinction that matters, and one that courts on the other side of the split have largely glossed over.
So what are the takeaways?
First, a federal court within the Sixth Circuit has now weighed in on the texts-versus-calls question, and it sides firmly with the “texts are not calls” position. That’s significant because there was no prior guidance from the 6th Circuit or any binding authority in this jurisdiction.
Second, the Court’s critique of the other side’s reasoning is the most thorough we’ve seen from any texts ≠ calls opinions. Here, the Court explained precisely why the dictionary analysis in Alvarez, Mujahid, Medvidi, Better Mortgage, and even the 9th Circuit’s Howard decision is flawed.
Lastly, the “1991 definition” approach is becoming the key battleground. Courts that define both “telephone” and “call” as of 1991 are landing on texts ≠ calls. Conversely, courts that use modern definitions or define “call” without considering “telephone” are reaching the conclusion that texts = calls.
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You are responsible for reading, understanding, and agreeing to the National Law Review’s (NLR’s) and the National Law Forum LLC’s Terms of Use and Privacy Policy before using the National Law Review website. The National Law Review is a free-to-use, no-log-in database of legal and business articles. The content and links on www.NatLawReview.com are intended for general information purposes only. Any legal analysis, legislative updates, or other content and links should not be construed as legal or professional advice or a substitute for such advice. No attorney-client or confidential relationship is formed by the transmission of information between you and the National Law Review website or any of the law firms, attorneys, or other professionals or organizations who include content on the National Law Review website. If you require legal or professional advice, kindly contact an attorney or other suitable professional advisor.
Some states have laws and ethical rules regarding solicitation and advertisement practices by attorneys and/or other professionals. The National Law Review is not a law firm nor is www.NatLawReview.com intended to be a referral service for attorneys and/or other professionals. The NLR does not wish, nor does it intend, to solicit the business of anyone or to refer anyone to an attorney or other professional. NLR does not answer legal questions nor will we refer you to an attorney or other professional if you request such information from us.
Under certain state laws, the following statements may be required on this website and we have included them in order to be in full compliance with these rules. The choice of a lawyer or other professional is an important decision and should not be based solely upon advertisements. Attorney Advertising Notice: Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome. Statement in compliance with Texas Rules of Professional Conduct. Unless otherwise noted, attorneys are not certified by the Texas Board of Legal Specialization, nor can NLR attest to the accuracy of any notation of Legal Specialization or other Professional Credentials.
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