54
New Articles
Find Your Next Job !
The Honorable Thomas W. Thrash of the Northern District of Georgia is well known—and well regarded— for his thoughtful and direct orders.
And he may have just entered one of his most consequential rulings to date—concluding that SMS messages are not telephone calls for TCPA purposes.
In Radvansky v. 1-800-Flowers.com, 2026 WL 456919 (N.D. Ga Feb. 17, 2026) Judge Thrash concluded the statutory language of the TCPA simply did not include SMS messages within its purview:
Statutory interpretation must “start with the text”—and, if the text is clear, the analysis “end[s] there as well.” Young v. Grand Canyon Univ., Inc., 980 F.3d 814, 818-19 (11th Cir. 2020). The statutory text here is clear that only telephone calls are actionable under ? 227(c)(5), not text messages. As one district court noted, “in common American English usage, a telephone call and a text message are separate and distinct forms of communication.” Sayed, 2025 WL 2997759, at *2. True, the meaning of these terms should be considered as they were understood at the time the TCPA was enacted, prior to the invention of text messages. See Loper Bright Enters., 603 U.S. at 400. But “[w]here the language Congress chose to express its intent is clear and unambiguous, that is as far as we go to ascertain its intent because we must presume that Congress said what it meant and meant what it said.” United States v. Steele, 147 F.3d 1316, 1318 (11th Cir. 1998). And as Judge May aptly pointed out, Congress has amended the TCPA as recently as 2019 to add the phrase “text message” in a neighboring provision, ? 227(e)(8)(C), and chose to leave ? 227(c)(5) unamended. Radvansky, 3:23-cv-00214-LLM, slip op. at 6. This distinction leads the Court to presume that Congress intended ? 227(c)(5) to encompass only telephone calls because “when a statute uses one term in one place and a distinct term elsewhere, the difference matters—that is, the distinct words have different meanings.” Sunshine State Reg’l Ctr., Inc. v. Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., 143 F.4th 1331, 1344 (11th Cir. 2025) (citation modified)
The court goes on to respectfully disagree with courts in other circuits that have held otherwise:
Finally, the Court is not persuaded by the several district court decisions the Plaintiff provides concluding that “telephone call” in ? 227(c)(5) does include text messages because the reasoning underlying these decisions is inherently flawed. For example, in Alvarez v. Fiesta Nissan, Inc., 2026 WL 202930 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 26, 2026), the district court acknowledged that “no ordinary person would use the word ‘telephone call’ to refer to a text message” before concluding that “a usage which seems obvious now is not always a reflection of the original meaning of the statute,” even though text messages did not yet exist when the statute was originally enacted. Alvarez, 2026 WL 202930, at *4. In Wilson v. MEDVIDI Inc., 2025 WL 2856295, (N.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2025), the district court reached beyond the statute’s plain text to find support for its conclusion in a 2024 edition of Black’s Law dictionary, which defies both the first rule of statutory interpretation and Loper Bright’s instruction that a statute’s meaning is fixed at the time of enactment. Wilson, 2025 WL 2856295, at *2; Young, 980 F.3d at 818-19; Loper Bright Enters., 603 U.S. at 400. And in Mujahid v. Newity, LLC, 2025 WL 3140725 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 10, 2025), the district court’s conclusion that “interpreting ? 227(c) to include text messages is consistent with the text of ? 227 as a whole” ignores the meaningful-variation canon—the idea that Congress must have intended distinct words in a statute to have different meanings. Mujahid, 2025 WL 3140725, at *2; Sunshine State Reg’l Ctr., Inc., 143 F.4th at 1344. Wilson v. Better Mortgage Corp., 2025 WL 3493815 (S.D.NY Dec. 5, 2025) applied similarly faulty reasoning.
More Upcoming Events
Sign Up for any (or all) of our 25+ Newsletters
You are responsible for reading, understanding, and agreeing to the National Law Review’s (NLR’s) and the National Law Forum LLC’s Terms of Use and Privacy Policy before using the National Law Review website. The National Law Review is a free-to-use, no-log-in database of legal and business articles. The content and links on www.NatLawReview.com are intended for general information purposes only. Any legal analysis, legislative updates, or other content and links should not be construed as legal or professional advice or a substitute for such advice. No attorney-client or confidential relationship is formed by the transmission of information between you and the National Law Review website or any of the law firms, attorneys, or other professionals or organizations who include content on the National Law Review website. If you require legal or professional advice, kindly contact an attorney or other suitable professional advisor.
Some states have laws and ethical rules regarding solicitation and advertisement practices by attorneys and/or other professionals. The National Law Review is not a law firm nor is www.NatLawReview.com intended to be a referral service for attorneys and/or other professionals. The NLR does not wish, nor does it intend, to solicit the business of anyone or to refer anyone to an attorney or other professional. NLR does not answer legal questions nor will we refer you to an attorney or other professional if you request such information from us.
Under certain state laws, the following statements may be required on this website and we have included them in order to be in full compliance with these rules. The choice of a lawyer or other professional is an important decision and should not be based solely upon advertisements. Attorney Advertising Notice: Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome. Statement in compliance with Texas Rules of Professional Conduct. Unless otherwise noted, attorneys are not certified by the Texas Board of Legal Specialization, nor can NLR attest to the accuracy of any notation of Legal Specialization or other Professional Credentials.
The National Law Review – National Law Forum LLC 2070 Green Bay Rd., Suite 178, Highland Park, IL 60035 Telephone (708) 357-3317 or toll-free (877) 357-3317. If you would like to contact us via email please click here.
Copyright ©2026 National Law Forum, LLC
Find Your Next Job !
The Honorable Thomas W. Thrash of the Northern District of Georgia is well known—and well regarded— for his thoughtful and direct orders.
And he may have just entered one of his most consequential rulings to date—concluding that SMS messages are not telephone calls for TCPA purposes.
In Radvansky v. 1-800-Flowers.com, 2026 WL 456919 (N.D. Ga Feb. 17, 2026) Judge Thrash concluded the statutory language of the TCPA simply did not include SMS messages within its purview:
Statutory interpretation must “start with the text”—and, if the text is clear, the analysis “end[s] there as well.” Young v. Grand Canyon Univ., Inc., 980 F.3d 814, 818-19 (11th Cir. 2020). The statutory text here is clear that only telephone calls are actionable under ? 227(c)(5), not text messages. As one district court noted, “in common American English usage, a telephone call and a text message are separate and distinct forms of communication.” Sayed, 2025 WL 2997759, at *2. True, the meaning of these terms should be considered as they were understood at the time the TCPA was enacted, prior to the invention of text messages. See Loper Bright Enters., 603 U.S. at 400. But “[w]here the language Congress chose to express its intent is clear and unambiguous, that is as far as we go to ascertain its intent because we must presume that Congress said what it meant and meant what it said.” United States v. Steele, 147 F.3d 1316, 1318 (11th Cir. 1998). And as Judge May aptly pointed out, Congress has amended the TCPA as recently as 2019 to add the phrase “text message” in a neighboring provision, ? 227(e)(8)(C), and chose to leave ? 227(c)(5) unamended. Radvansky, 3:23-cv-00214-LLM, slip op. at 6. This distinction leads the Court to presume that Congress intended ? 227(c)(5) to encompass only telephone calls because “when a statute uses one term in one place and a distinct term elsewhere, the difference matters—that is, the distinct words have different meanings.” Sunshine State Reg’l Ctr., Inc. v. Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., 143 F.4th 1331, 1344 (11th Cir. 2025) (citation modified)
The court goes on to respectfully disagree with courts in other circuits that have held otherwise:
Finally, the Court is not persuaded by the several district court decisions the Plaintiff provides concluding that “telephone call” in ? 227(c)(5) does include text messages because the reasoning underlying these decisions is inherently flawed. For example, in Alvarez v. Fiesta Nissan, Inc., 2026 WL 202930 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 26, 2026), the district court acknowledged that “no ordinary person would use the word ‘telephone call’ to refer to a text message” before concluding that “a usage which seems obvious now is not always a reflection of the original meaning of the statute,” even though text messages did not yet exist when the statute was originally enacted. Alvarez, 2026 WL 202930, at *4. In Wilson v. MEDVIDI Inc., 2025 WL 2856295, (N.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2025), the district court reached beyond the statute’s plain text to find support for its conclusion in a 2024 edition of Black’s Law dictionary, which defies both the first rule of statutory interpretation and Loper Bright’s instruction that a statute’s meaning is fixed at the time of enactment. Wilson, 2025 WL 2856295, at *2; Young, 980 F.3d at 818-19; Loper Bright Enters., 603 U.S. at 400. And in Mujahid v. Newity, LLC, 2025 WL 3140725 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 10, 2025), the district court’s conclusion that “interpreting ? 227(c) to include text messages is consistent with the text of ? 227 as a whole” ignores the meaningful-variation canon—the idea that Congress must have intended distinct words in a statute to have different meanings. Mujahid, 2025 WL 3140725, at *2; Sunshine State Reg’l Ctr., Inc., 143 F.4th at 1344. Wilson v. Better Mortgage Corp., 2025 WL 3493815 (S.D.NY Dec. 5, 2025) applied similarly faulty reasoning.
More Upcoming Events
Sign Up for any (or all) of our 25+ Newsletters
You are responsible for reading, understanding, and agreeing to the National Law Review’s (NLR’s) and the National Law Forum LLC’s Terms of Use and Privacy Policy before using the National Law Review website. The National Law Review is a free-to-use, no-log-in database of legal and business articles. The content and links on www.NatLawReview.com are intended for general information purposes only. Any legal analysis, legislative updates, or other content and links should not be construed as legal or professional advice or a substitute for such advice. No attorney-client or confidential relationship is formed by the transmission of information between you and the National Law Review website or any of the law firms, attorneys, or other professionals or organizations who include content on the National Law Review website. If you require legal or professional advice, kindly contact an attorney or other suitable professional advisor.
Some states have laws and ethical rules regarding solicitation and advertisement practices by attorneys and/or other professionals. The National Law Review is not a law firm nor is www.NatLawReview.com intended to be a referral service for attorneys and/or other professionals. The NLR does not wish, nor does it intend, to solicit the business of anyone or to refer anyone to an attorney or other professional. NLR does not answer legal questions nor will we refer you to an attorney or other professional if you request such information from us.
Under certain state laws, the following statements may be required on this website and we have included them in order to be in full compliance with these rules. The choice of a lawyer or other professional is an important decision and should not be based solely upon advertisements. Attorney Advertising Notice: Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome. Statement in compliance with Texas Rules of Professional Conduct. Unless otherwise noted, attorneys are not certified by the Texas Board of Legal Specialization, nor can NLR attest to the accuracy of any notation of Legal Specialization or other Professional Credentials.
The National Law Review – National Law Forum LLC 2070 Green Bay Rd., Suite 178, Highland Park, IL 60035 Telephone (708) 357-3317 or toll-free (877) 357-3317. If you would like to contact us via email please click here.
Copyright ©2026 National Law Forum, LLC